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PROOF 1
A Qualitative Approach Can Be Rigorous
Jean-Franc¸ois Bare´
Unite´ mixte de recherche “De´veloppement et socie´te´s,”
Universite´ Paris I et Institut de recherche pour le de´velop-
pement, Antenne de Bordeaux, Maison des Suds, 12 Espla-
nade des Antilles, 33607 Pessac Cedex, France
(bare@ades.cnrs.fr). 2 VII 09
La rigueur du qualitatif: les contraintes empiriques de
l’interpre´tation socio-anthropologique. By Jean-Pierre Olivier
de Sardan. Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia Bruylant, 2008.
It is a great and rare pleasure that a long-time professional
in anthropology, with forty years of fieldwork in West Africa,
notably in Niger, has dared to confront, through a deep epis-
temological reflection, the central, thorny question, How sci-
entific is anthropology? In other words, can anthropology be
classified as one of the “experimental sciences,” in the manner
of Karl Popper’s “refutability” and “falsifiability,” or even as
one of Thomas Kuhn’s succession of “paradigms”? Con-
versely, can it be assigned to a kind of subjective rhetoric on
things human, as the latest works of Geertz and “postmod-
ernism” seemed to imply?
Olivier de Sardan suspects that the “labeling policy” in
fashion in the United States, which he describes as “a popular
sport,” would probably define him as a “post-positivist” (p.
265) for offering the following: social sciences (and hence
anthropology) “are fundamentally interpretative (a correlate:
scientist positivism and naturalism cannot be sustained); so-
cial sciences are empirical sciences (a correlate: epistemolog-
ical anarchism and postmodernism are not sustainable ei-
ther)” (p. 265, my translation). In a nutshell, his position is
that anthropology is not a science in the sense defined by
Claude Bernard or Karl Popper because it does not include
experimentation, consubstantial to experimental sciences, as
they define it. Fieldwork, which is the only experimental ap-
proach that we share and is thoroughly discussed here, ob-
viously cannot be correlated in a one-to-one fashion with
scientific experimentation, insofar as one cannot change the
protocol and say “What would happen now?” Neither can it
be primarily a romantic or “subjective” hobby, if only because
anthropologists working in the same area often recount sur-
prisingly similar observations, despite differences in the train-
ing of the people involved and the scope of the studies. In
short, anthropology is more of a way of knowing than a
science, and what is wrong with that, after all?
From his vast and thorough bibliographic review, Olivier
de Sardan concludes that an Anglo-Saxon excessive scientism
has made his question more salient in recent American an-
thropology than in European. Still, his position cannot be
assigned to a supposedly “French” or “anti-American” school,
and he is right in saying that a systematic use of the “em-
blematic figure” of Claude Le´vi-Strauss to represent French
anthropology considerably biases the debate on a would-be
French anthropology (p. 17); not to mention the fact that
Le´vi-Strauss’s positions about anthropology’s scientificity var-
ied considerably during his long and rich career. When the
American Lawrence Kuznar (1997), although not quoted in
this book, “reclaim[ed] a scientific anthropology” a few years
ago, he only hinted at a controlled empiricism. He also alluded
to the various and naive driftings of postmodernism in Amer-
ica, to self-contradictory dealings with such notions as “sub-
jectivity,” and finally to the very notion of a “subject” (Bare´
1999) and whether it should encompass the anthropologists
themselves and the persons they interview or include other
notions, such as “reflexivity” (see Olivier de Sardan’s chapter
5 on the “methodological I”). In that sense, he shared many
positions with Olivier de Sardan, and I am sure that he is not
alone.
The topic of objectivity is, of course, part of a very old
philosophical debate. One of this book’s interests when deal-
ing with basically philosophical debates is to keep them in-
scribed into the very practice of a profession. One cannot
better sum up the general argument than by the opening
quotations: first from Max Weber, “empirical disciplines elab-
orate the qualitative aspect of reality . . . including history”;
next from Sherlock Holmes (possibly a humorous allusion),
“it’s a capital mistake to theorize before one has data”; and
above all from the sociologist and former Bourdieu collab-
orator Jean-Claude Passeron, “sociological theory which does
not present itself to inspection as empirical stays as a meta-
physical theory.” This book indeed follows Passeron’s general
positions on the epistemological unity of anthropology, so-
ciology, and history and on the notion of “plausibility” of
data, as opposed to Popper’s refutability or “falsifiability,” as
argued in his remarkable book Le raisonnement sociologique
(1991).
All these fundamental questions are discussed with equal
interest in chapters primarily collected from previously pub-
lished articles, but the whole progression unfolds from a basic
idea, “the approximative rigor of anthropology” (p. 7), an
apparent self-contradiction commented on throughout the
introduction. The reasoned critique of “culturalism,” toward
a “moral epistemology” of fieldwork, developed in chapter 2
(“The Politics of Fieldwork”) should stand as a reference on
fieldwork. Chapter 3 is a thorough discussion of the notion
of “emics” (or the actor’s point of view), and chapter 4 is an
outstanding commentary on “observation” and “description,”
vital concepts in a discipline that is basically descriptive, what-
ever the abstraction involved (see p. 133). Chapter 5, on “the
methodological I” and the anthropologist’s implication in
fieldwork, is mentioned above; chapter 6 is a critical reflection
on “populism” in anthropology. Chapter 7 is about “over-
interpretation or violence inflicted on data” and, being of
equal quality, may be the most questionable argument because
of the problem of defining overinterpretation in a discipline
literally built on interpretation. The conclusion discusses the
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reciprocal relationships between “common sense and clerical
sense,” and a very interesting postscript specifically addresses
the reciprocal relationships between the researcher and the
“citizen,” reminding us of Weber’s distinction between “le
savant et le politique.”
It is all the more interesting that Olivier de Sardan, after
a lifetime of various personal involvements, concludes that
“la sociologie n’est pas un sport de combat” and should not
be one, making an ironical allusion to a 2001 TV movie
devoted to the late Pierre Bourdieu under the exact opposite
title, “La sociologie est un sport de combat.” Finally, let us
make note of an excellent bibliography, somewhat arbitrary,
as is any bibliography, but showing in itself the work’s con-
sistency and intelligence. This is a rare and important book.
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QUERIES TO THE AUTHOR
1 (a) In the first sentence of the paragraph, the introduction
of the translated passage has been revised. Does the revised sen-
tence express your intended meaning accurately? (b) In the trans-
lated passage, should “scientist positivism” be “scientific
positivism”?
2 Is the observation about the variability of Le´vi-Strauss’s po-
sition on this matter your own aside, or is it a point that Olivier
de Sardan makes in his book?
3 The sentence about chapter 7 is somewhat hard to follow,
particularly the passage “being of . . . argument.” Does the fol-
lowing express your intended meaning accurately? “Chapter 7 is
about ‘overinterpretation or violence inflicted on data’; although
of the same high quality as the rest of the book, it may present
the most questionable argument because of the problem of de-
fining overinterpretation in a discipline literally built on
interpretation.”
